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Terms of reference 
I, PETER COSTELLO, Treasurer, pursuant to Parts 2 and 3 of the Productivity 
Commission Act 1998, hereby refer the following to the Commission for inquiry and 
report within twelve months of receipt of this reference. 
Background 
The National Third Party Access Regime for Natural Gas Pipelines (Gas Access 
Regime) was established in November 1997 by agreement of the Commonwealth, 
State and Territory Governments. The Gas Pipelines Access Law, including the 
National Third Party Access Code for Natural Gas Pipeline Systems (the Gas Code) 
implements the access objectives agreed by all jurisdictions.  
II.  The efficient implementation and operation of the Gas Access Regime has the 
potential to contribute significantly to the energy policy objectives identified by the 
Council of Australian Governments (CoAG). The Commonwealth Government has 
released its interim response to the Review of Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act 
1974 (the National Access Regime) under which the Gas Code is certified. In 
addition, the imminent completion of regulators’ final decisions in the first round of 
access arrangements means that there is now an emerging case history that allows 
an assessment of the effectiveness of the Gas Access Regime.  
III.  The primary aim of this Review is to follow the National Access Regime 
Review and to examine the extent to which current gas access arrangements balance 
the interests of relevant parties, provide a framework that enables efficient 
investment in new pipeline and network infrastructure and can assist in facilitating a 
competitive market for natural gas. There is no intention that the Review reconsider 
existing or pending access arrangements.  
Scope of inquiry 
IV.  Within the framework of Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act 1974, clause 6 
of the Competition Principles Agreement 1995, the National Energy Policy 
Framework agreed by CoAG in June 2001 and outcomes arising from the CoAG 
Independent Review of Energy Market Directions, conduct a review of the Gas 
Access Regime to: 
1.  Analyse and, as far as reasonably practical, assess the benefits, costs and effects 
of the Gas Access Regime, including its effect on investment both in the sector 
and in upstream and downstream markets.     




2.  Identify any necessary improvements to the Gas Access Regime, its objectives 
and its application, and in particular the Gas Code, to ensure uniform third party 
access arrangements are implemented and applied on a consistent, national 
basis. The Report of the review should consider and where appropriate make 
recommendations on: 
a)    how the Gas Access Regime might better facilitate a competitive market for 
energy services, including through the promotion of: 
i)  commercially negotiated outcomes; 
ii)  effective upstream and downstream competition; 
iii)  effective retail contestability on a consistent and timely basis; and 
iv)  a competitive market for natural gas. 
b)  the appropriate consistency between the Gas Code, the National Access 
Regime and other access regimes, including in relation to regulatory roles, 
responsibilities and accountability, and whether transmission and distribution 
assets require separate approaches. 
c)    the Gas Code’s effect on investment in transmission pipelines and 
distribution networks, including the operation of those parts of the Code 
dealing with the tender process, ring fencing, information gathering and 
expansions/extensions of pipelines and networks. 
d)  the institutional and decision-making arrangements under the Gas Access 
Regime. 
3.  Identify and investigate the appropriateness of including in the Gas Code 
minimum (price and non-price) requirements by which pipeline and/or network 
owners and operators can provide a fully competitive, open and transparent third 
party access service on a non-discriminatory and economically efficient basis to 
users.  
Considerations 
V.  In making assessments, and in recommending changes to the Gas Access 
Regime including the National Third Party Access Code for Natural Gas Pipelines, 
the Review should take into account: 
1.  Pricing and non-pricing aspects of monopoly and competitive market behaviour; 
2.  Different roles and requirements of transmission and distribution networks; 
3.  The need to maintain an appropriate balance between investor, asset operator, 
gas producer and current and future gas consumer interests;     




4.  Certainty, transparency, timeliness and accountability requirements for regulated 
network services, compliance costs, and appropriate incentives for longer term 
efficiency and productivity improvements;  
5.  Economic and regional development, environmental, energy security, fuel 
choice, financial risk management and business competitiveness considerations; 
and 
6.  Consistency with Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act 1974, in particular with 
relation to the objects clause and pricing principles. 
VI. In considering these terms of reference, the Report should also take account of: 
1.  The Governments’ response to the Productivity Commission’s Review of the 
National Access Regime; 
2.  the Governments’ response to the CoAG Independent Review of Energy Market 
Directions; and 
3.  relevant court cases including the Australian Competition Tribunal decision and 
findings  on   the Eastern Gas Pipeline, May 2001 and the Supreme Court of 
Western Australia judgement on the Dampier to Bunbury natural gas pipeline, 
August 2002. 
VII.  The review is to consult with key interest groups and affected parties, issue a 
draft report, hold hearings and produce a final report within twelve months. 
 
PETER COSTELLO 
[Reference received 13 June 2003]     
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Abbreviations and explanations 
Abbreviations 
ABARE  Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
ACCC Australian  Competition  and Consumer Commission 
ACG Allen  Consulting  Group 
AEMC  Australian Energy Market Commission 
AER Australian  Energy  Regulator 
AGA  Australian Gas Association 
AGL  Australian Gas Light Company  
AMDQ authorised  maximum daily quantity 
APIA   Australian Pipeline Industry Association 
APT  Australian Pipeline Trust 
ARC  Administrative Review Council 
ASIC Australian  Securities  and Investments Commission 
CAPM   capital asset pricing model  
CCIWA   Chamber of Commerce and Industry of WA 
COAG   Council of Australian Governments 
CPA  Competition Principles Agreement  
DAC  depreciated actual cost 
DEA  data envelopment analysis 
DORC  depreciated optimal replacement cost 
EAPL  East Australian Pipeline Limited 
ENA Energy  Networks  Association 
ERA Economic  Regulation  Authority 
ESC  Essential Services Commission (Victoria)   
 
XVI  GLOSSARY  
 
Gas Access Regime   National Third Party Access Regime for Natural Gas 
Pipelines  
Gas Code   National Third Party Access Code for Natural Gas Pipeline 
Systems 
GPAL  Gas Pipelines Access Law 
IEA International  Energy Agency 
IPART Independent  Pricing  and Regulatory Tribunal 
IRR   internal rate of return  
LNG  liquefied natural gas 
LPG  liquefied petroleum gas 
MCE Ministerial  Council  on  Energy 
NCC   National Competition Council 
NECG   Network Economics Consulting Group 
NERA  National Economic Research Associates 
NGPAC  National Gas Pipelines Advisory Committee 
NPV  net present value 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OffGAR  Western Australian Office of Gas Access Regulation 
PEG  Pacific Economics Group 
PSO  Price service offering 
QCA Queensland  Competition Authority  
ROR  rate of return 
SEA Gas  South East Australia Gas  
SRMC  Short-run marginal cost 
TFP total  factor  productivity 
TPA  Trade Practices Act 1974 
WACC   weighted average cost of capital     





Billion  The convention used for a billion is a thousand million (109).
Findings  Findings in the body of the report are paragraphs high-
lighted using italics, as this is. 
GJ Gigajoule  (10
9 joules). 
PJ Petajoule  (10
15 joules). 
Recommendations  Recommendations in the body of the report are highlighted 
using bold italics, as this is. 




   
 





Arrangement by owner or operator of a covered pipeline
setting out the terms and conditions and tariffs on which 
third parties may seek access to the services of the pipeline.
Access arrangements must be approved by the relevant




A binding ruling is a ruling on coverage given prior to the 
commitment to invest in a new pipeline. The ruling is made
using the coverage criteria and processes. A binding 
coverage ruling could apply for (a) a fixed period after the 
new pipeline commences operations; (b) until  specific 
criteria, such as a certain cumulative level of profit, are met;
or (c) until circumstances are judged to have changed in such
a way as to warrant revocation of the ruling. A binding 
coverage ruling has the same effect as a regulation free
period (see definition below) if a ruling is made in favour of 
no third party access regulation for a certain period without 
conditions after the regulation free period has been granted. 
Coverage process  Process by which a pipeline becomes covered under the Gas
Access Regime. 
Covered pipeline  Pipeline to which the provisions of the Gas Code apply. 
Distribution  The transport of gas through smaller diameter, lower
pressure pipelines to end users and consumers. 




Longer term contracts between service providers and
prospective users prior to pipeline construction. These
contracts effectively underwrite pipeline investment and
reduce some of the pipeline investor’s risk.     






Proposed pipelines and new pipelines, the market for the
output of which was previously non-existent. 
Judicial review  Proceedings seeking civil penalties, damages, injunctions or
declarations in relation to alleged breaches of the Gas Code. 
Merit appeal  A tribunal review of a decision on the merits (undertaken by 
a review tribunal). The tribunal can ‘step in the shoes’ of
government decision makers and affirm, set aside or vary the 
decision according to the merits of individual cases. 
Reference service  A service that is specified in an access arrangement and in
respect of which a reference tariff has been specified in that
access arrangement. 
Reference tariff  A tariff specified in an access arrangement as corresponding
to a reference service and which has the operation that is
described in ss6.13 and 6.18 of the Gas Code. 
Regulation free 
period 
A period during which a new pipeline cannot be subjected to
third party access regulation. A regulation free period
commences when a new pipeline starts operating and may 
last for either a fixed period or continue until specific
criteria, such as a certain level of cumulative profit, are met. 
Regulation free periods can be either automatic for all new
pipelines, or be restricted to new pipelines that meet certain 
criteria, such as vertical separation of ownership. 
Ring fencing  The separation of the business of providing transmission and
distribution services from other related businesses. 
Schedule A  Schedule A of the Gas Code, listing pipelines that were 
covered from the commencement of the Gas Code.  
Service provider  In relation to a pipeline or proposed pipeline, the person who
is, or is to be, the owner or operator of the whole or any part
of the pipeline or proposed pipeline.  
Transmission  The transport of gas through larger diameter, higher pressure
pipelines from a production area into a distribution network
or directly to a large consumer.   
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Truncation   Truncation occurs where the distribution of return is
constrained due to regulation. 
Upstream  That part of the gas industry covering gas exploration,
production and processing, and the transportation of raw gas
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•  The National Third Party Access Regime for Natural Gas Pipelines is designed to 
provide third party access to natural gas transmission and distribution pipelines 
where access would otherwise be constrained by the misuse of market power. 
•  Australia’s natural gas sector has experienced major reforms, structural change and 
growth over the last decade. 
–  Although competition is emerging (in part due to greater connectivity), a gas 
access regime of some type is still warranted. 
•  The current Gas Access Regime, in effect, is a form of cost-based price regulation. 
While generating benefits, its significant costs include a potential to distort 
investment. 
•  A key recommendation is the addition of a less costly, monitoring option. 
•  The choice between price regulation and monitoring for each covered pipeline would 
be based on which was assessed as generating the greater net economic benefits. 
–  Price regulation would only apply when the net benefits would be markedly 
greater than those of the monitoring option. 
•  Other recommendations include: 
– sharpening the specification of the objectives of the regime by inserting an 
overarching objects clause with a focus on promoting efficiency and by removing 
inappropriate and conflicting objectives scattered through the regime 
–  changing the test for coverage 
–  replacing the current guidelines for approving reference tariffs with a clear set of 
pricing principles 
–  including scope to use non-building block approaches to setting reference tariffs. 
•  The recommended objects clause, coverage criteria and pricing principles have also 
been worded to be consistent with the Australian Government’s proposed changes to 
the national access regime. 
•  To make the regime conform with the above recommendations, considerable 
streamlining is recommended for the detailed guidance for determining access 
arrangements and reference tariffs and for dispute resolution. 
•  To reduce the potential chilling effect of the regulation on greenfield investments, it is 
proposed that there be scope in the Gas Access Regime for a binding ruling of ‘no 
coverage’ for 15 years, on a case-by-case basis. 
–  It would apply to proposed pipelines that do not meet the coverage criteria. 
•  Implementing the recommendations would enable the benefits of access regulation 
to be achieved at lower cost to the economy. 
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Overview 
The National Third Party Access Regime for Natural Gas Pipelines (the Gas Access 
Regime) is an industry-specific regime for third party access to natural gas 
transmission and distribution pipelines. A key element of the regime is the National 
Third Party Access Code for Natural Gas Pipeline Systems (the Gas Code), which 
was agreed to by the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) in 1997. The 
national regime is implemented by each State and Territory incorporating the Gas 
Code into its own gas access law. Although many key requirements are common 
across States and Territories, there are some differences, including such matters as 
establishing jurisdictional regulators and arbitrators that can lead to regulatory 
divergences. 
The Commission has been asked to review the regime with the primary aim of 
examining the extent to which the Gas Access Regime balances the interests of 
relevant parties, provides a framework that enables efficient investment in pipelines 
and network infrastructure and facilitates the development of competition in the 
natural gas market. The Commission also has been asked to identify what the 
minimum (price and non price) requirements in the Gas Code would be to achieve 
the third party access objective. 
The Commission’s review is being undertaken within the framework of the national 
access regime (part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act 1974), clause 6 of the 
Competition Principles Agreement 1995, the National Energy Policy Framework 
agreed to by COAG in June 2001 and recent policy statements by the Ministerial 
Council on Energy. The Commission is also required to take into consideration the 
Australian Government’s response to the Commission’s review of the national 
access regime and outcomes arising from the COAG Energy Market Review (Parer 
report). 
Gas Access Regime 
The Gas Access Regime applies to natural gas transmission and distribution 
pipelines (box 1). 
Initially, 22 transmission pipeline systems and 14 distribution networks were 
automatically covered by being listed in schedule A of the Gas Code. Since then,     




one new transmission pipeline and three new distribution networks have been 
covered. 
 
Box 1  Gas Access Regime 
The Gas Access Regime only applies to pipelines that are ‘covered’ under the regime. 
There are four ways a pipeline may be covered: 
•  Listed in schedule A of the Gas Code, which was approved by COAG in 1997. 
•  A service provider requests coverage and has an access arrangement approved by 
the relevant regulator. 
•  The relevant Minister decides to cover, following a recommendation from the 
National Competition Council and a request for coverage by any person. 
•  Where the outcome of a competitive tender process for a new pipeline is approved 
by the relevant regulator. 
Once a pipeline is covered, a service provider is required to have an access 
arrangement approved by the relevant regulator (Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission or relevant State or Territory regulator). Guidelines for access 
arrangements are set out in the Gas Code, such as the conditions under which access 
will be offered (including prices), policies relevant to the operation and extension of a 
pipeline, and a review date. 
A service provider and access seeker are free to agree on terms and conditions that 
differ from those in the access arrangement. However, if an access dispute about a 
reference service arises, the arbitrator (relevant regulator or nominee) is required to 
impose the default terms and conditions set out in the access arrangement (for 
example, price will be set to the relevant reference service tariff). There are 
mechanisms for appealing decisions, including those on coverage and access 
arrangements. 
The relevant Minister can revoke coverage of a pipeline, following an application for 
revocation by any person and a recommendation by the National Competition Council. 
 
 
Coverage for 13 transmission systems (or parts thereof) and six distribution 
networks has been revoked. There has been one decision to cover that was 
subsequently overturned by the Australian Competition Tribunal. Twenty-two of 
the 24  transmission and distribution systems currently covered have approved 
access arrangements in place. Although coverage has been revoked for a number of 
pipelines, most of the major pipelines remain covered. 
Not all throughput of a covered pipeline is subject to regulated prices. In the case of 
transmission  pipelines, a major proportion of throughput is priced according to 
foundation and other contracts established prior to the advent of the Gas Access 
Regime and therefore not yet influenced by the regulation. In the case of     
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distribution networks, most throughput is purchased through contracts based on 
regulated prices. In the future, the influence of regulated prices is expected to 
increase as old contracts expire and new contracts are negotiated. 
Is there a case for a gas access regime? 
Potential for market power that inhibits competition 
Natural gas transmission and distribution pipelines exhibit ‘natural monopoly’ 
characteristics — one pipeline system can transport gas along a specific route more 
cheaply than two or more independent systems. In an unregulated situation, there is 
potential for the operator of such a pipeline system to have substantial and enduring 
market power. Such market power can be used to inhibit competition in upstream 
and downstream markets by denying third party access to the transportation services 
of the pipeline system or by imposing terms and conditions on access (including 
price). Such market power can also be used to charge high prices, leading to 
inefficiencies in the gas market. 
At the time the Gas Code was being developed, the Australian gas market was 
characterised by vertically integrated, public monopolies. There was concern by 
governments that utilities could use their market power to inhibit competition. 
Consequently, COAG agreed to introduce a uniform regulatory approach to 
promote competition in the gas market. 
Other competitive forces 
The existence of gas pipelines that exhibit natural monopoly characteristics is 
insufficient to conclude that these pipelines have enduring market power which can 
be misused. Consideration also needs to be given to the nature of the demand 
characteristics for the services of pipelines. A number of competitive forces and 
factors can impact on demand and constrain market power. 
The demand for gas is derived from the demand for the goods or services produced 
using natural gas as an input. Gas is often supplied to industries that produce 
commodities sold in competitive markets (such as mineral processing and electricity 
generation). In such industries, end use might be sensitive to the transportation 
price. New pipelines (both transmission and distribution) are often developed in 
contestable markets, where they compete vigorously to secure sufficient load for the 
pipeline from prospective users. For transmission pipelines, securing such load 
helps to reduce both the developer’s exposure to risk and to underwrite investment.     




In addition, large end users might represent a large proportion of the pipeline’s 
capacity and therefore might have significant, countervailing bargaining power. 
Further, gas often has other close substitutes in end use, such as coal, electricity, 
LPG, oil and distillate, particularly in the case of distribution networks. 
In the above circumstances, a rise in the relative price of gas could result in a 
significant loss of sales and a decrease in profit, particularly in the medium and long 
term, as users replace gas consumption with a substitute. Consequently, pipeline 
operators can find the exercising of market power unsustainable. 
Emerging pipeline competition 
The nature of the gas market has changed markedly since the commencement of the 
reforms in the early nineties. Many of the vertically integrated public gas utilities 
have been structurally disaggregated and the separated entities privatised. Retail 
competition is being progressively introduced in most jurisdictions. There is 
emerging competition between independent gas basins and between transmission 
pipelines servicing specific markets, such as Adelaide and Sydney. As the 
interconnectivity of the gas transmission network has increased, the dynamic nature 
of, and the market opportunities in, the sector have also increased. There is potential 
for relatively small investments in interconnecting pipelines to increase the level of 
competition and to change how gas moves between sources of supply and end use 
markets. This trend is expected to continue as the transmission system in eastern 
Australia continues to become increasingly integrated. 
A gas access regime is still warranted 
Although many participants have substantial concerns about the current regime, 
there is widespread acceptance of the need for some form of access regime for gas 
pipelines. 
Participants expressed strongly a range of views about the Gas Access Regime. The 
views typically reflected their interest. Gas users, in general, consider that the 
regime has been beneficial and has delivered them lower prices. A number of 
regulators were of the view that, despite the transitional costs of implementation, 
there have been substantial benefits and likely to be greater benefits realised in the 
future. The views of gas producers varied. Although service providers acknowledge 
there have been significant benefits from gas reform and the Gas Access Regime, 
they consider there are a number of significant deficiencies in the regime that need 
to be addressed. Although competition is increasing in a number of areas, the gas     
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market is still in transition and competition has not reached a level where a gas 
access regime is no longer warranted. 
The Commission considers that the original arguments put forward for a gas 
industry-specific access regime are still valid at this time and are likely to remain so 
for some time. A number of pipelines are still likely to warrant regulation. There is 
likely to be more than one access seeker for some pipelines (particularly for gas 
distribution networks). A generally available access arrangement for such pipelines 
is likely to involve lower costs than requiring each access seeker to seek access 
through the negotiate–arbitrate framework of the national access regime (part IIIA 
of the Trade Practices Act). Consequently, the Commission considers that an 
industry-specific national access regime for gas transmission and distribution 
pipelines is still warranted. 
The challenge is to design a gas access regime that encourages and strengthens the 
development of competition and innovation, and also imposes forms of regulatory 
intervention only where they are likely to generate net economic benefits. 
What are the problems with the current regime? 
Quantifying the benefits and costs of the Gas Access Regime is extremely difficult, 
particularly in the absence of information about what would have occurred without 
the regime (the counterfactual). This is even more difficult because, while most of 
the significant pipelines are covered, much of the gas transported is delivered under 
long-term contracts and is not directly regulated, there are other dynamic 
competitive forces at work as competition emerges, and other policy influences are 
simultaneously at work. 
The Commission has not attempted to undertake a formal cost–benefit analysis of 
the impact of the Gas Access Regime using models, such as general equilibrium 
models. The uncertainties about relevant (access regime specific) data (including 
variations across jurisdictions and across end-users), behavioural relationships and 
counterfactual scenarios to be input into such models, would cast considerable 
doubt about the conclusions which could reasonably be drawn from such modelling. 
Further, such modelling would bring little clarity to deciding on whether and how to 
improve the existing regime. 
Based on the Commission’s assessment (of both costs and benefits), including 
taking into account input from interested parties, it is reasonable to conclude that 
there are problems with the current regime. These mainly arise from the 
considerable costs the regime imposes and its real potential to distort investment 
and inhibit innovation.     




The characteristics of the current regime that lead to these high costs are briefly 
outlined below. 
Too great a focus on cost-based price regulation 
The original approach for access regulation (as reflected in the Competition 
Principles Agreement and subsequent enactment of the national access regime) was 
to promote competition in upstream and downstream markets. This was to be 
achieved by establishing a legal right for third parties to negotiate access to the 
services of essential facilities (such as gas transmission and distribution pipelines). 
The approach included scope for variations in the terms and conditions for third 
party access, based around a negotiate–arbitrate framework. 
Although the Gas Access Regime appears to be based on a negotiate–arbitrate 
framework, third party access prices, in effect, are determined using cost-based 
price regulation. This outcome arises because of the fundamental role attached to 
reference tariffs in the event of a dispute over access to a reference service and the 
way in which tariffs for reference services must be determined under the regime. 
The service provider of a covered pipeline must put in place an access arrangement 
containing reference tariffs for one or more reference services that are likely to be 
sought by a significant part of the market. If there is an unresolved dispute over the 
price of a reference service, the arbitrator (relevant regulator) must require the 
service provider and user to accept the reference tariff of a reference service. 
In approving the reference tariff, the regulator must ensure that it complies with the 
reference tariff principles, which essentially require tariffs to be based on estimated 
efficient costs of supply. Under the regime, regulators are required to replicate the 
outcome of a competitive market. This is an unachievable task and one which 
inherently involves substantial regulatory risk and scope for error, particularly given 
the emergence of competition and the potential impact of competitive forces in 
constraining the sustainable misuse of market power. 
The outcome has been that third party access is essentially based on the regulator 
approved cost-based reference tariffs. There is a high degree of risk that the price 
set by the regulator is no more efficient than that which would have prevailed in the 
absence of price regulation, particularly given the other deficiencies in the 
regulation discussed below. There is a prospect that the regulation of prices is 
leading to a distortion in investment (towards lower risk projects) and delaying the 
development of new pipelines, which then slows down the emergence of 
competition in related energy markets and between pipelines.      
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Too many conflicting objectives within the gas access law 
There is a lack of clarity in the legislation about its objectives. Although the 
preamble, which is based on the objectives set out in the Natural Gas Pipelines 
Access Agreement 1997, can be used to imply objectives, the regime has no objects 
clause. Moreover, the regime has complex sets of principles and factors to be taken 
into account by the regulators in approving an access arrangement, reference tariffs 
and dispute arbitration. Further, regulators may take ‘other factors’ into account that 
they consider relevant (factors not mentioned in the Gas Code) in approving an 
access arrangement. 
The Supreme Court of Western Australia, in a judicial review of the Western 
Australian regulator’s draft decision on the proposed access arrangement for the 
Dampier–Bunbury pipeline, concluded that there was tension between the many 
objectives requiring resolution by the regulator. 
It is common practice for regulators (and the courts) to be given some discretion to 
take into account factors that might vary from case to case. However, for the Gas 
Access Regime, the Commission has concluded there are too many objectives, some 
of which are in conflict and some of which do not appear directly relevant to the 
overall policy objective of the regulation. 
A range of methods can be applied 
In addition to the wide range of factors and principles to be considered, the Gas 
Code sets out various methods that can be applied to determine reference tariffs, 
rate of return, depreciation, and incentive mechanisms. Different interests usually 
seek to have the values of such parameters set in a way that favours their own 
circumstances.  
Wide discretionary powers of regulators 
The Gas Access Regime provides regulators with wide discretionary powers in 
approving access arrangements. Regulators are able to attach any weight they 
consider relevant when weighing up conflicting factors and principles. This leads to 
regulatory uncertainty as the weights attached to factors can vary on a case-by-case 
basis. The regime also provides regulators with discretionary powers to extend the 
time taken to finalise access arrangements. 
Although some degree of discretion is appropriate, the Gas Access Regime provides 
virtually unlimited discretion. This aspect of the regime is exacerbated by the wide     




range of objectives given to regulators. It leads to widely different stakeholder 
expectations about the regulatory outcomes achievable, thereby creating stronger 
incentives for disputation, uncertainty and a high probability of inconsistency in the 
application of the regulation. 
High information and research costs 
Regulators seek a large amount of detailed information from service providers and 
users. They also commission or undertake a substantial amount of research. In this 
way, service providers and regulators can incur large costs. Principally, regulators 
require the information to satisfy themselves that they have discharged their 
responsibilities in relation to approving and determining reference tariffs, in 
accordance with the flexible and highly discretionary framework set out in the 
regime. The outcome is the intrusive and meticulous use of the ‘building block’ cost 
method and incentive regulation framework to set reference tariffs with a false 
sense of precision. 
Too many regulatory decisions 
A service provider has to go through two decisions (draft and final) by the relevant 
regulator, and frequently a third (further final), possibly ending with the regulator 
drafting and approving the access arrangement. Both the draft and final decisions 
involve public consultation, which takes time. All these decisions have to be made 
before a merits appeal can be initiated. When the service provider and regulator 
fundamentally disagree, there are four stages for determining an approved access 
arrangement (including the merits appeal). This process extends unnecessarily the 
time to get an access arrangement approved when there is disagreement between the 
regulator and the service provider. 
Number of jurisdictional bodies approving access arrangements 
There are a large number of regulatory and merits appeal bodies, principally 
because State and Territory jurisdictions initially wanted sovereignty of distribution 
network regulation. There are two regulators and two merits appeal bodies dealing 
with transmission pipelines. In the case of gas distribution, there are eight regulators 
and five merits appeal bodies. The large number of regulators and merits appeal 
bodies can create the potential for inconsistent outcomes and increase regulatory 
risk for service providers and third party access seekers. This issue will be partly 
addressed by the decision of the Ministerial Council on Energy to establish a 
national energy regulator, which will assume responsibilities for gas transmission     
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and distribution in all jurisdictions other than Western Australia (which may 
ultimately also join). 
Governance arrangements 
There has been concern by some participants about the effectiveness of the 
institutional arrangements to manage changes to the Gas Code. The Natural Gas 
Pipelines Advisory Committee is not working well. Significant reform of this 
committee is necessary. However, this issue would seem to be addressed by the 
recent decision of the Ministerial Council on Energy to establish the Australian 
Energy Market Commission, which will be responsible for managing rule making, 
including code changes, for electricity and ultimately gas. 
Impact of the regime on investment 
Service providers argued that the Gas Access Regime distorts pipeline investment. 
On the other hand, a number of users and regulators provided data on the substantial 
investment in pipelines since the inception of the regime. 
It is difficult to draw conclusions from the information provided by inquiry 
participants because the ‘no regulation’ scenario is unobservable. Projects that did 
not proceed might not have been viable in any event. On the other hand, observing 
actual investment does not prove that investment has not been distorted. For 
example, growing gas demand probably would have led to some investment taking 
place in any event. 
In addition, the impact on investment of other reforms to the gas sector and 
additional factors, such as the discovery of new gas fields, cannot be easily 
separated from those of the regime.  
In light of the above, the Commission considers that an assessment of the effects of 
the regime on investment must include not only the possible positive effects on 
investment, but also an examination of the likelihood of cost-based price regulation 
being applied to pipelines with little or no market power, regulatory error occurring 
in approving and determining cost-based regulated prices, and the existence of 
regulatory risk from uncertainty about how regulation might be applied. 
As noted previously, gas pipelines have natural monopoly characteristics but, in 
some circumstances, the potential to exercise market power might be constrained. 
Thus, for some pipelines, the benefits of relying on cost-based regulated prices as 
the principal instrument for achieving the benefits arising from third party access 
might be small and difficult to realise in practice. The Commission considers that     




this is a possibility under the regime because the current coverage test sets too low a 
threshold for cost-based price regulation. 
The Commission also considers that there is a potential for regulatory error under 
the regime due to the complex issues involved in determining a reference tariff, 
including the need to make a subjective judgment about the risk faced by a service 
provider. Where regulatory errors do occur under the regime, there is a possibility 
that they reduce expected returns for riskier projects below those necessary for 
efficient investment. For example, the expected rate of return allowed by regulators 
has been based on the precedents set for established, possibly lower risk, pipelines. 
In addition, recent appeal decisions suggest that regulators err towards imposing 
lower returns.  
The Commission considers that regulatory risk can be high under the regime due to 
the fact that a new pipeline might be covered at some future time. There is also 
uncertainty about the values of various parameters a regulator might apply in 
approving reference tariffs (such as the weighted average cost of capital) and 
uncertainty about future decisions that could lead to redundant capital. Evidence of 
asymmetric truncation (capping high profits) is not as clear cut, due to the limited 
number of access arrangement reviews to date. Nevertheless, the Commission 
considers that investors will anticipate asymmetric truncation under the Gas Access 
Regime, particularly for riskier projects, because of: 
•  the difficulty regulators have in distinguishing between higher returns on risky 
projects and monopoly returns, after the investment has been made 
•  the incentives regulators can face to reduce any high profits observed after the 
investment has been made. 
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission has issued a draft 
greenfields guideline to address perceptions that there is regulatory risk under the 
regime and that regulators asymmetrically truncate profits. However, the 
Commission considers that this guideline does not substantially alter the potential 
for investment to be distorted. The guideline is only a draft — and has been so for at 
least two years — and it maintains the wide discretion that the Gas Code gives to 
regulators to set key regulatory parameters. 
The effect of the Gas Access Regime on future investment might also arise through 
its indirect effect on foundation customers, even though the regime only applies to 
third party access and excludes foundation customer contracts in place prior to 
coverage. New transmission projects generally require simultaneous large, 
long-term investments to be made by gas producers in production facilities, by 
service providers in pipelines and by foundation customers in large industrial 
processes or power generation. Foundation customers play an important role in the     
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development of transmission pipelines, providing a way to share the risks across all 
those involved. The regulator could set regulated access prices (reference tariffs) 
that are below the prices agreed to by foundation customers of the pipeline. The 
third party access seekers might also be competitors of the foundation customers 
and receive a competitive advantage by way of being a third party access seeker. In 
this environment, it is reasonable to expect future foundation customers to include 
clauses in their contracts that ensure they are not commercially disadvantaged by 
third party access and are able to share in any future cost reductions arising from the 
exploitation of economies of scale. 
The Commission considers that the Gas Access Regime is likely to distort 
investment in favour of lower risk projects. This could result in a greater reliance 
than otherwise on building capacity that is essentially fully contracted, expanding 
capacity incrementally and delaying pipeline construction until forecast demand is 
more certain. 
What changes are required? 
A full list of the Commission’s findings and recommendations follow this overview. 
They set out the Commission’s recommendations on the way to improve the 
operation of the regime. A key change being proposed by the Commission is the 
addition of a new light-handed regulation option (a monitoring regime). Some of the 
more important recommendations are discussed below. 
Include an objects clause 
Inclusion of an overarching objects clause is highly desirable to clarify the policy 
intent of the regime; guide and improve the accountability of Ministers, regulators, 
arbitrators, tribunals and courts; provide greater certainty to service providers and 
access seekers about possible regulatory intervention; and promote national 
consistency (both across jurisdictions and between access regimes). 
The recommended overarching objective of the regime is ‘to promote the 
economically efficient operation and use of, and economically efficient investment 
in, the services of transmission pipelines and distribution networks, thereby 
promoting effective competition in upstream and downstream markets’. The objects 
clause is essentially the same as that proposed by the Australian Government for the 
national access regime. The Commission considers it important to have the two 
regimes consistent.     




The Commission recommends modifications and deletions to other sections of the 
Gas Code to remove any unwarranted, conflicting objectives. The changes affect the 
criteria and guidance in sections dealing with access arrangements, reference tariffs 
and dispute resolution. 
Modification of the coverage criteria 
The Commission recommends that the (revised) coverage criteria for the Gas 
Access Regime (box 2) be essentially the same as the Australian Government’s 
proposed declaration criteria for the national access regime. Consistency is 
important. Adopting a matching set of coverage and declaration criteria for the two 
regimes avoids overlap, ensuring that the Gas Access Regime has primacy for gas 
transmission and distribution pipelines. Therefore, a pipeline not covered under the 
Gas Access Regime also would not be declared under the national access regime. 
 
Box 2  Recommended coverage criteria for the Gas Code 
The Commission recommends replacing s.1.9 of the Gas Code with the following 
proposed coverage criteria:  
Subject to sections 1.4(a) and 1.10, the NCC [National Competition Council] must 
recommend that the Pipeline be Covered (either to the extent described, or to a greater or 
lesser extent than that described, in the application) if the NCC is satisfied of all of the 
following matters, and cannot recommend the Pipeline be Covered, to any extent, if the NCC 
is not satisfied of one or more of the following matters: 
(a) that access (or increased access) to Services provided by means of the Pipeline would 
promote a material increase in competition in at least one market (whether or not in 
Australia), other than the market for the Services provided by means of the Pipeline; 
(b) that it would be uneconomic for anyone to develop another Pipeline to provide the 
Services provided by means of the Pipeline; 
(c)  that access (or increased access) to the Services provided by means of the Pipeline can 
be provided without undue risk to human health or safety; and  
(d) that access (or increased access) to the Services provided by means of the Pipeline 
would not be contrary to the public interest. 
 
Modification of access arrangement provisions 
The Commission has made a number of recommendations in relation to access 
arrangements and reference tariffs in particular. A key recommendation is the 
replacement of the existing general objectives to be achieved by regulators in 
approving reference tariffs with a more specific and operational set of pricing 
principles (box 3). These principles are essentially the same as those proposed by     
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the Australian Government for inclusion in the national access regime. Once again, 
consistency is important. 
 
Box 3  Recommended pricing principles 
The Commission recommends replacing s.8.1 of the Gas Code with the following: 
A reference tariff or reference tariff policy should be designed with regard to the overarching 
objects clause, s.2.24 and the following principles:  
(a) that reference tariffs should: 
(i)  be set so as to generate expected revenue for a reference service or services that is 
at least sufficient to meet the efficient costs of providing access to the reference 
service or services  
(ii) include a return on investment commensurate with the regulatory and commercial 
risks involved 
(b) that reference tariff structures should: 
(i)  allow multi-part pricing and price discrimination when it aids efficiency 
(ii) not allow a vertically integrated service provider to set terms and conditions that 
discriminate in favour of its associated businesses in upstream or downstream 
markets, except to the extent that the cost of providing access to non-associates is 
higher 
(c) that reference tariffs should be set so as to provide incentives to reduce costs or 
otherwise improve productivity. 
 
 
The Commission also recommends that service providers be able to apply methods 
other than the ‘building block’ approach to design reference tariffs, provided they 
are consistent with the objects clause and pricing principles. The Commission also 
recommends deletions and amendments to other sections of the Gas Code to make 
them consistent with the policy intent behind the objects clause and pricing 
principles. The recommended modifications of guidelines for access arrangements 
are designed to maintain the benefits of, and reduce the economic costs associated 
with, the application of price regulation. 
Addition of a monitoring option 
The Commission considers that the existing regime leads to the application of 
cost-based price regulation (through the application of reference tariffs) in situations 
where it is doubtful that it maximises net benefits to the economy, after taking into 
account the economic costs of regulation.  
The Commission appreciates that the gas market is in transition and there is still 
uncertainty about the potential for competition in many areas. However, looking 
forward, the gas market is likely to become increasingly dynamic as     




interconnectivity increases, basin on basin competition develops and gas producers 
and users respond to the commercial opportunities generated by these changes. 
In this situation, the Commission considers there is merit in introducing a 
monitoring option to be applied to those covered pipelines that meet certain 
requirements. The features of the monitoring option would include: 
•  a service provider prescribed third party access policy 
•  subjecting service providers to the anticompetitive conduct provisions of the 
existing regime 
•  a service provider prescribed framework for negotiation and binding arbitration 
in the event of dispute over access 
•  subjecting monitored pipelines to some of the ring fencing provisions that 
currently apply to covered pipelines 
•  public disclosure of specified information for monitoring purposes only  
•  scope for the service provider to implement additional features such as a 
voluntary code of conduct. 
Service providers, at their discretion, would set out in their access policy the 
procedures and any terms and conditions for gaining access and the way they 
propose to handle matters relating to queuing, capacity trading and expansion. 
In part, the effectiveness of the monitoring regime depends upon the threat of price 
regulation involving an access arrangement with reference tariffs. The Commission 
recommends that monitoring be applied for a minimum of five years to give parties 
incentives to negotiate commercially. After the initial five-year monitoring period, 
the relevant Minister would be able to decide that regulation involving an access 
arrangement with reference tariffs should apply. The relevant Minister’s decision 
would need to be preceded by a recommendation from the National Competition 
Council on the form of regulation to apply, which only the regulator responsible for 
oversight of monitoring would be able to request. 
Inclusion of a formal monitoring option provides a way of keeping some covered 
pipelines out of price regulation in situations where the case to apply price 
regulation is not strong, but the relevant Minister considers it would be 
inappropriate not to cover the pipeline. It also offers a practical way of making the 
transition from price regulation to no regulation in a phased way. Further, it enables 
the costs of price regulation to be avoided, while providing users with a degree of 
confidence that the behaviour of service providers is being ‘watched’ and still 
facilitating third party access. In other words, it enables the benefits of the existing 
regime to be achieved, but at a lower cost to the economy.     
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The Commission has made a number of recommendations on how to incorporate 
the monitoring option into the Gas Access Regime, including suggestions on how to 
discourage its development into an intrusive and costly form of regulation. 
The Commission recommends that an assessment of net economic benefits be used 
in deciding on which form of regulation should apply (that is, between monitoring 
and price regulation involving an access arrangement with reference tariffs). This 
choice would depend on which form of regulation generates greater net benefits. An 
access arrangement with reference tariffs would only apply where the net benefits 
are markedly above those for the monitoring option. The Commission recommends 
the inclusion of specific factors in the Gas Access Regime to be used by both the 
Minister in deciding on, and the National Competition Council in recommending 
on, the form of regulation to apply to covered pipelines. 
To deal with transitional matters, the Commission recommends that at the time the 
new regime comes into effect, the coverage status and form of regulation initially 
would be the same as those applying under the old regime. 
The framework for decisions on coverage and the form of regulation is depicted in 
figure 1. Applications for coverage or revocation would occur on a case-by-case 
basis. Any person can apply for revocation at any stage. Any person can apply for 
coverage of an uncovered pipeline at any stage. For monitored pipelines, only the 
regulator responsible for administration of monitoring can apply for a move to price 
regulation at any time after each five-year monitoring term. This review process for 
a monitored pipeline could lead to a decision to continue monitoring for five years, 
or a move to price regulation. 
Institutional arrangements 
The Commission recommends that the agency responsible for making 
recommendations on coverage and the form of access regulation (monitoring or 
price regulation involving an access arrangement with reference tariffs) to the 
relevant Minister should be separate to, and independent of, the agency responsible 
for administering the forms of regulation to be applied under coverage. 
Certification of the new regime 
Certification that the Gas Access Regime is an effective regime within the context 
of the national access regime is important. Certification by the Minister, following a 
recommendation from the National Competition Council, ensures the primacy of the 
Gas Access Regime over the national access regime for covered gas pipelines and 
prevents regulatory forum shopping.     




Figure 1  Proposed framework for deciding coverage and form of 
regulationa 
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a The National Competition Council follows an identical process in recommending to the Minister whether a 
pipeline should be covered, and if so, what form of regulation should apply.  
The National Competition Council, in commenting on the Commission’s proposal 
set out in the draft report, raised issues about whether the proposed Gas Access 
Regime could be certified effective (that is, consistent with the Competition 
Principles Agreement). The main concern related to the absence of provisions for 
negotiation and binding arbitration under the then proposed monitoring option. 
The Commission recommends that under the monitoring form of regulation, service 
providers be required to prescribe a framework for commercial negotiation and 
binding arbitration. Further, as described earlier, it would be possible for the 
relevant Minister to decide to subject the monitored pipeline to price regulation 
involving an access arrangement with reference tariffs at the end of its five-year 
monitoring period. Under this latter form of regulation there is already provision for 
binding arbitration, with the regulator (or its nominee) acting as the arbitrator.     
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The Commission considers that, given the characteristics of the now recommended 
regime, it is likely that the Minister and the National Competition Council would 
assess the new regime as effective. However, the situation will remain uncertain 
until the Minister and the National Competition Council formally consider 
certification of the new regime. In light of this uncertainty, the Commission 
recommends that clause 6 of the Competition Principles Agreement be modified as 
recommended by the Commission in its review of the national access regime 
(box 4). The Australian Government, in its response to the Commission’s report, 
supported the recommendation to modify clause 6 of the Competition Principles 
Agreement. 
 
Box 4  Commission’s finding on criteria to assess the effectiveness 
of State and Territory access regimes 
Ideally an ‘effective’ access regime should include the following: 
•  an objects clause (specifying that the objective of the regime is to promote the 
efficient use of, and investment in, the essential infrastructure facilities concerned) 
•  coverage arrangements that focus mainly on services for which it would be 
uneconomic to develop another facility to provide the service 
•  clearly specified dispute resolution arrangements and provisions to establish the 
terms and conditions of access 
•  clearly specified criteria and pricing principles applying to regulated terms and 
conditions 
•  effective appeal and enforcement provisions 
•  revocation and review requirements for all determinations 
•  where relevant, provisions to facilitate consistency across multiple State and 
Territory access regimes applying to a particular service 
•  where relevant, provision for measures to facilitate efficient new investment. 
The degree of reliance on negotiation, relative to arbitration and regulation, to set 
terms and conditions of access should be a matter for individual regimes and not be a 
part of the effectiveness test. 
 
 
Binding no-coverage rulings 
At present, the National Competition Council can only offer informal, nonbinding 
advice to potential investors about whether a specific pipeline project would satisfy 
the coverage criteria. To help reduce regulatory risk for some new pipelines prior to 
the investment commitment, the Commission recommends that the Minister be able 
to provide a binding ruling of no coverage for a period of 15 years, following a     




recommendation by the National Competition Council. The binding ruling would be 
applied to proposed pipeline projects that would not satisfy the coverage criteria. 
How would the changes benefit the community? 
Adoption of the Commission’s recommendations would deliver more efficient 
outcomes, particularly in relation to investment in the gas sector and the 
development of a competitive energy market. The recommendations would reduce 
regulatory risk, potential for regulatory error and the time and cost of regulatory 
procedures and improve regulatory accountability. The recommendations are 
designed to achieve the benefits of the existing regime while reducing many of its 
costs.     




Findings and recommendations 
Australian gas industry 
Transmission pipelines have natural monopoly characteristics. The scope for 
transmission pipeline owners to exercise market power arising from such 
characteristics can be constrained by a number of factors, including:  
•  the availability of substitutes — that is, the presence of a competing pipeline in 
the end market and/or of substitute fuel and energy sources  
•  the size and concentration of users and the competitive nature of foundation 
contracts  
•  the elasticity of demand for the final products, for which natural gas is an input.  
The extent to which these factors constrain market power differs across pipelines. 
Distribution networks have natural monopoly characteristics. The scope for 
distribution network owners to exercise market power arising from such 
characteristics can be constrained by a number of factors, including the availability 
of other fuel and energy substitutes. The extent to which market power is 
constrained differs across networks. A network owner servicing a new market (or 
one in which use is low) generally has little market power. 
The market conditions facing the gas transmission and distribution sectors have 
changed since the Gas Access Regime was developed. In the transmission sector 
participants are increasingly having to respond to new opportunities that arise in 
an emerging competitive market. Competition in this sector is expected to increase 
further through even greater connectivity. The gas distribution sector is also facing 
more competitive market conditions arising, in particular, from a more competitive 
electricity sector. Notwithstanding these changes, the gas market is still in 
transition. In this environment, some form of a gas access regime is still warranted. 
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Gas Access Regime 
The Gas Access Regime is a form of price regulation based on a cost-of-service 
model. It is, therefore, at the more intrusive end of regulation.  
Is the Gas Access Regime working? 
An industry-specific access regime is appropriate for gas transmission pipelines 
and distribution networks because of its advantages over the negotiate–arbitrate 
model of the national access regime.  
The Gas Access Regime has delivered benefits through determining the terms of 
third party access to pipelines and facilitating competition in upstream and 
downstream markets.  
The Gas Access Regime is likely to be distorting investment in favour of less risky 
projects, including altering the nature and timing of pipeline investments. Pipeline 
construction might be delayed, for example, and there might be greater emphasis on 
building capacity that is essentially fully contracted prior to construction. Such 
alterations can inhibit the emergence of competition in upstream and downstream 
markets and generate inefficiencies.  
Information provided by interested parties supports the view that the Gas Access 
Regime might have a discouraging effect on innovation and improvements in 
service offerings. 
Generally, cost-based price regulation should be considered only if service 
providers have substantial market power. Where market power is not strong, such 
as where there is emerging competition, in the long run the costs of regulated prices 
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There are significant compliance and administration costs in the operation of the 
Gas Access Regime. Delays in decision making have added to the costs.  
The existing Gas Access Regime has deficiencies. Improvements are possible.  
Objectives and objectives clause 
There is a need to specify more clearly the objectives of the Gas Access Regime. 
The incorporation of an overarching objects clause into the Gas Access Regime 
legislation would enhance the effectiveness of the regime. 
The following overarching objects clause should be incorporated into the Gas 
Access Regime, with the wording consistent with the Australian Government’s 
proposed objects clause for the national access regime: 
  To promote the economically efficient operation and use of, and economically 
efficient investment in, the services of transmission pipelines and distribution 
networks, thereby promoting effective competition in upstream and 
downstream markets.  
For decisions about coverage, the form of regulation and regulated access terms 
and conditions, the relevant decision maker should be explicitly guided by the 
overarching objects clause. 
With the implementation of recommendation 5.1, the following objectives in the 
preamble to the existing legislation and the related objectives in the introduction 
to the Gas Code should be deleted: 
(a) facilitates the development and operation of a national market for natural gas 
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(c)  promotes a competitive market for natural gas in which customers may 
choose suppliers, including producers, retailers and traders 
(d) provides for rights of access to natural gas pipelines on conditions that are 
fair and reasonable for the owners and operators of gas transmission and 
distribution pipelines and persons wishing to use the services of those 
pipelines 
(e)  provides for the resolution of disputes.  
The following elements of s.2.24 of the Gas Code are necessary to provide guidance 
for regulators when assessing access arrangements and should be retained: 
(b) firm and binding contractual obligations of the Service Provider or other 
persons (or both) already using the Covered Pipeline 
(c) the operational and technical requirements necessary for the safe and reliable 
operation of the Covered Pipeline. 
The following elements of s.2.24 of the Gas Code do not provide necessary 
guidance to regulators when assessing access arrangements and should be 
deleted: 
(a) the Service Provider’s legitimate business interests and investment in the 
Covered Pipeline 
(d)  the economically efficient operation of the Covered Pipeline 
(e) the public interest, including the public interest in having competition in 
markets (whether or not in Australia) 
(f)  the interests of Users and Prospective Users 
(g)  any other matters that the Relevant Regulator considers are relevant. 
The following elements of s.6.15 of the Gas Code are necessary to provide guidance 
for arbitrators when arbitrating disputes over access arrangements and should be 
retained: 
(e) firm and binding contractual obligations of the Service Provider or other 
persons (or both) already using the Covered Pipeline 
(f)  the operational and technical requirements necessary for the safe and reliable 
operation of the Covered Pipeline. 
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The following elements of s.6.15 of the Gas Code do not provide necessary 
guidance to arbitrators when arbitrating disputes over access arrangements and 
should be deleted: 
(a) the Service Provider’s legitimate business interests and investment in the 
Covered Pipeline 
(b) the costs to the Service Provider of providing access, including any costs of 
extending the Covered Pipeline, but not costs associated with losses arising 
from increased competition in upstream or downstream markets 
(c)  the economic value to the Service Provider of any additional investment that 
the Prospective User or the Service Provider has agreed to undertake 
(d) the interests of all Users 
(g) the economically efficient operation of the Covered Pipeline 
(h) the benefit to the public from having competitive markets. 
An additional factor should be added to s.6.15 of the Gas Code, as follows: 
  In the event of a dispute about the price of access to a non-reference service, 
the arbitrator should be guided by the pricing principles in s.8.1 of the Gas 
Code (as revised by recommendation 7.1).  
Coverage issues 
It is important that the coverage process and criteria are designed so that 
regulatory intervention occurs only in those circumstances in which it is likely the 
benefits of regulation outweigh its costs. 
Different coverage criteria for transmission pipelines and distribution networks are 
not warranted. The coverage criteria should be sufficiently flexible to deal with 
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If the threshold for coverage under the Gas Access Regime were higher than that 
for declaration in the national access regime, pipelines that do not satisfy the 
coverage criteria under the Gas Access Regime could be declared under the 
national access regime if they were to satisfy the declaration criteria. 
In circumstances of there being a specific Gas Access Regime, it is desirable for this 
regime to have primacy over the national access regime.  
The Gas Access Regime coverage criteria should provide the same threshold for 
coverage as declaration under the national access regime, such that a pipeline not 
satisfying the coverage criteria of the Gas Access Regime also will not satisfy the 
declaration criteria of the national access regime.  
The first criterion for assessing coverage (s.1.9[a] of the Gas Code) should be 
amended to reflect the Australian Government’s proposed change to s.44G(2)(a) 
in part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act (the national access regime). That is, that 
the National Competition Council would need to be satisfied:  
(a) that access (or increased access) to Services provided by means of the Pipeline 
would promote a material increase in competition in at least one market 
(whether or not in Australia), other than the market for the Services provided 
by means of the Pipeline. 
The Minister would also be bound by this change as per s.1.15 of the Gas Code.  
The following criteria should be retained in the coverage criteria (s.1.9 of the Gas 
Code): 
(b) that it would be uneconomic for anyone to develop another Pipeline to provide 
the Services provided by means of the Pipeline 
(c) that access (or increased access) to the Services provided by means of the 
Pipeline can be provided without undue risk to human health or safety 
(d) that access (or increased access) to the Services provided by means of the 
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The Gas Access Regime should be modified such that the Minister and National 
Competition Council, in making a decision and recommendation, respectively, to 
cover a pipeline, should also decide and recommend, respectively, the form of 
regulation to apply.  
The decision and recommendation on the form of regulation to apply should be 
based on an assessment of the net benefits to the economy of each form of 
regulation (an access arrangement with reference tariffs or monitoring option). 
Access arrangements with reference tariffs should be applied only where the net 
benefits of its application are markedly greater than the net benefits of the 
monitoring option. Otherwise the monitoring option should be applied. 
There would be benefits from improved consistency and reduced uncertainty if the 
Minister and the National Competition Council were provided with guidance on the 
matters to be considered when deciding and recommending, respectively, which 
form of regulation should apply.  
The Gas Access Regime should be amended to give guidance on matters that the 
Minister and the National Competition Council should consider in deciding and 
recommending, respectively, which form of regulation should apply to a covered 
pipeline. 
In determining the potential benefits of either form of regulation, the following 
matters should be taken into account:  
(a)  the nature of demand for the commodities and services of end users of gas 
(b)  the actual and potential level of competition from substitutes such as gas from 
other sources delivered through other pipelines, and other forms of energy 
such as electricity 
(c)  the nature and extent of any barriers to entry in the market 
(d)  the degree of countervailing power in the market 
(e)  the degree of horizontal and vertical integration 
(f) any other significant factors, subject to them being consistent with the 
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In determining the potential costs of either form of regulation, the following 
matters should be taken into account:  
(a)  direct costs of service providers, governments and users 
(b) other costs (for example, distortions in behaviour arising from timeliness, 
regulatory risk and regulatory error (such as the inherent difficulties in 
determining efficient costs for services)) 
(c) any other significant factors, subject to them being consistent with the 
proposed new objects clause.  
The Gas Access Regime should be amended to provide that where a service 
provider potentially covered by the Gas Code lodges a part IIIA undertaking, this 
should trigger an assessment (currently by the National Competition Council) 
and decision (by the Minister) on whether the pipeline meets the requirements for 
coverage under the Gas Code. The Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission’s assessment of the part IIIA undertaking should be held over, 
pending the outcome of the triggered coverage assessment and decision. 
Access arrangements 
Redistributing efficiency gains to users on an ex post basis could decrease the scope 
for regulatory error. However, this might come at the expense of reducing the 
incentive properties of the current ex ante approach. 
Replicating the outcome of a competitive market (s.8.1(b) of the Gas Code) is an 
unachievable objective for setting reference tariffs. Seeking to apply the concept of 
workable competition does not provide a practical approach to this problem.  
There would be benefits in replacing the existing reference tariff objectives (s.8.1 of 
the Gas Code) with the pricing principles that the Australian Government has 
agreed to adopt for the national access regime. This would provide more specific 
and operational guidance for setting reference tariffs under the Gas Access Regime 
and ensure consistency with the national access regime. 
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In order to provide more specific and operational guidance for setting reference 
tariffs under the Gas Access Regime, and ensure consistency with the national 
access regime, s.8.1 of the Gas Code should be replaced with the following: 
s.8.1 A reference tariff or reference tariff policy should be designed with regard to 
the overarching objects clause, s.2.24 and the following principles:  
(a)  that reference tariffs should: 
(i)  be set so as to generate expected revenue for a reference service or 
services that is at least sufficient to meet the efficient costs of 
providing access to the reference service or services  
(ii) include a return on investment commensurate with the regulatory 
and commercial risks involved 
(b)  that reference tariff structures should: 
(i)  allow multi-part pricing and price discrimination when it aids 
efficiency 
(ii) not allow a vertically integrated service provider to set terms and 
conditions that discriminate in favour of its associated businesses in 
upstream or downstream markets, except to the extent that the cost 
of providing access to non-associates is higher 
(c)  that reference tariffs should be set so as to provide incentives to reduce 
costs or otherwise improve productivity. 
To ensure there is no conflict with the pricing principles specified in 
recommendation 7.1, the following should be deleted from the Gas Code: 
•  the overview in italics at the beginning of s.8 
•  ss8.2(c), 8.3(a), 8.38–8.43 and 8.45. 
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To ensure there is no conflict with the pricing principles specified in 
recommendation 7.1, the first paragraph of s.8.44 of the Gas Code should be 
changed to: 
s.8.44  The Reference Tariff Policy should, wherever the Relevant Regulator 
considers appropriate, contain a mechanism (an Incentive Mechanism) 
that permits the Service Provider to retain all, or any share of, any returns 
to the Service Provider from the sale of Reference Services in aggregate 
(not individual Reference Services when there is more than one): 
And s.8.46 of the Gas Code should be changed to: 
s.8.46 The design of an Incentive Mechanism should be consistent with achieving 
the overall objective of the Gas Access Regime and the pricing principles 
specified in s.8.1. 
To ensure the guidance given to regulators is consistent with 
recommendation 7.1, s.8.6 of the Gas Code should be changed to the following: 
s.8.6    In view of the manner in which the Rate of Return, Capital Base, 
Depreciation Schedule and Non Capital Costs may be determined (in each 
case involving various discretions), a range of values may be attributed to 
the Total Revenue described in section  8.4. In order to assess whether a 
value proposed by a Service Provider is within this range the Relevant 
Regulator may have regard to any financial and operational performance 
indicators it considers relevant in order to determine whether the level of 
costs nominated by the Service Provider is within the range of plausible 
outcomes under section  8.4 that is consistent with the pricing principles 
contained in section 8.1. 
To provide greater flexibility for price regulation than that provided by the 
current building block approach, s.8.5 of the Gas Code should be replaced with 
the following: 
s.8.5 A Service Provider can use another method to calculate Total Revenue, 
provided the Relevant Regulator is satisfied that the proposed method is 
more likely to meet the overall objective of the Gas Access Regime. 
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The Commission supports continuing efforts to find improved ways of determining 
the path of reference tariffs from one access arrangement review to the next. 
Section 8.21 of the Gas Code should be amended so that regulators can, at their 
discretion, undertake less public consultation than is required for a proposed 
revision to an access arrangement under s.2.28. If this discretion is exercised, the 
regulator should issue a written statement outlining clearly why the reduced 
public consultation was justified prior to issuing a binding decision under s.8.21 
that proposed investment in an extension or expansion of a covered pipeline 
would meet the requirements for incorporation into the capital base. 
To ensure there is no conflict with the pricing principles specified in 
recommendation 7.1, s.8.26(c) of the Gas Code should be deleted. 
To ensure there is no conflict between the depreciation provisions of the Gas 
Code and the pricing principles specified in recommendation 7.1, ss8.32, 8.33(a) 
and 8.34(d) should be replaced with the following:  
s.8.32  The Depreciation Schedule is the set of depreciation schedules (one of 
which may correspond to each asset or group of assets that form part of 
the Covered Pipeline) that is the basis upon which the assets that form 
part of the Capital Base are to be depreciated for the purposes of 
satisfying the pricing principles in section 8.1. 
s.8.33(a) so as to result in the expected Total Revenue attributable to a Service 
Provider’s Reference Services in aggregate (not individual Reference 
Services when there is more than one) changing over time in a manner 
that is consistent with the efficient operation and use of the Services 
(and which may involve a substantial portion of the depreciation taking 
place in future periods, particularly where the calculation of Total 
Revenue has assumed significant market growth and the Pipeline has 
been sized accordingly); 
s.8.34(d)  the expected Total Revenue attributable to a Service Provider’s 
Reference Services in aggregate (not individual Reference Services 
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Arrangement Period in a manner that is consistent with the efficient 
operation and use of the Services (and which may involve a substantial 
portion of the depreciation taking place towards the end of the Access 
Arrangement Period, particularly where the calculation of Total 
Revenue has assumed significant market growth and the Pipeline has 
been sized accordingly). 
To ensure regulators are given clear guidance about the uncertainty associated 
with calculating an ex ante regulatory rate of return, s.8.31 of the Gas Code 
should be changed to the following: 
s.8.31 If a Rate of Return is used in determining a Reference Tariff then the 
method used to calculate the Rate of Return and the values used in 
applying that method shall in the first instance be proposed by the Service 
Provider. In assessing the Service Provider’s proposal the Relevant 
Regulator must take account of the fact that there is no single correct 
method to determine a Rate of Return and there is often a range of 
plausible estimates that could be used in applying a Rate of Return method. 
The role of the Relevant Regulator is therefore to assess whether the 
Service Provider’s: 
(a)  proposed method has a plausible conceptual basis; and  
(b)  values used in applying the method lie within the range of plausible 
estimates.  
  The Relevant Regulator must approve the proposed method if (a) is 
satisfied. The Relevant Regulator must approve the values used in applying 
a method if (b) is satisfied. 
To ensure that the Gas Code is consistent with recommendations 7.1 and 7.5, 
s.8.30 of the Gas Code should be changed to the following: 
s.8.30 If a Rate of Return is used in determining a Reference Tariff then the Rate 
of Return should provide a return which is commensurate with prevailing 
conditions in the market for funds and the risk involved in delivering the 
Reference Service (as reflected in the terms and conditions on which the 
Reference Service is offered and any other risk associated with delivering 
the Reference Service including that resulting from regulation). 
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There is disagreement among technical experts about how regulatory rates of 
return (WACC) in Australia compare to those in other countries. This illustrates the 
inevitable imprecision and subjectivity that occurs when regulators are required to 
approve reference tariffs. 
A study should be undertaken by a group of recognised experts in the field of 
financial economics that considers whether a robust method can be developed for 
setting businesses’ expected rate of return on capital under incentive regulation. 
This should include a review of the use of the capital asset pricing model by 
Australian regulators. 
Simplifying the Gas Code’s competitive tendering provisions would make them 
more flexible and less costly. For example, the tender approval process could be 
streamlined by allowing a person simultaneously tendering for both a transmission 
and distribution system to have the tender process considered by a single regulator. 
To enable regulators to assess the cost allocations used to determine a service 
provider’s total revenue, a new clause should be inserted in s.7 of the Gas Code as 
follows: 
•  During the Access Arrangement Period the Service Provider should collect 
and maintain data on the variables used as the basis of cost allocations for the 
purpose of deriving Total Revenue. 
The Gas Code should be amended so that the information that service providers 
are required to provide under ss2.6–2.7 and attachment A does not include 
information on cost allocations between different reference services (where there 
is more than one) or between users.  
Regulators are currently seeking to have their powers under the Gas Access Regime 
extended so they can obtain information between access arrangement reviews. This 
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There is scope for some regulators to use State-based powers to obtain information 
from regulated distributors that is beyond what is specified in the Gas Access 
Regime. This could impose unwarranted costs and lead to inconsistencies in the 
information requirements on service providers across jurisdictions.  
To ensure that regulators cannot use State-based powers to access information 
beyond that specified in the Gas Access Regime, a new clause should be inserted 
into s.7 of the Gas Code as follows: 
•  The Relevant Regulator for the purposes of approving a Service Provider’s 
Access Arrangement can only use information collected under the information 
collection powers specified in the Gas Access Regime. 
Section 3.16 of the Gas Code should be amended so that it unambiguously 
clarifies that any expansion of a covered pipeline will also be covered. 
There is high potential for regulatory error when approving reference tariffs. The 
Gas Access Regime requires regulators to make decisions about future market 
circumstances that are uncertain. This has led regulators to use many debatable 
assumptions. There is a consequential tendency for regulators to seek additional 
information from service providers and further studies by consultants. This is 
unlikely to reduce uncertainty significantly. 
The current regulatory approach of cost-based price regulation is costly, especially 
in relation to the market impact. Therefore, while some refinements to the existing 
regulatory approach are needed, there is a sound basis also for an alternative less 
costly approach in certain circumstances that will generate larger net benefits. 
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Light-handed regulation  
The Gas Access Regime should be amended to provide for a light-handed form of 
regulation as an alternative to regulation involving an access arrangement with 
reference tariffs. The light-handed alternative should be a monitoring regime. It 
is important that the monitoring regime not develop into an intrusive and costly 
form of regulation. 
The proposed monitoring form of regulation to be incorporated into the Gas 
Access Regime should have the following features: 
•  a third party access policy formulated by the service provider which would 
have some minimum requirements relating to processes for negotiating access 
and binding arbitration in the event of a dispute over access 
•  subjecting service providers to provisions for anticompetitive conduct (the 
current s.13 of schedule 1 of the Gas Pipelines Access Law) 
•  minimum ring fencing provisions 
•  public disclosure of specified information by the service provider for 
monitoring purposes only (which would be well short of the ‘access 
arrangement information’ currently required under the Gas Code) 
•  scope for the service provider to adopt, at its discretion, additional features, 
such as a voluntary code of conduct. 
The access policy prescribed by service providers under the proposed monitoring 
regime should include at a minimum: 
•  processes for negotiating access 
•  dispute resolution procedures (including provision for binding commercial 
arbitration). 
A service provider in formulating its access policy would be guided by the 
requirements of parts of s.3 of the Gas Code, which includes: 
•  a services policy (ss3.1–3.2) 
•  a reference tariff and a reference tariff policy (ss3.3 and 3.5) 
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•  a capacity management policy (s.3.7) 
•  a trading policy (ss3.9–3.11) 
•  a queuing policy (ss3.12–3.13 and 3.15)  
•  an extensions/expansions policy (s.3.16). 
Under the proposed monitoring regime, to encourage service providers to provide 
third party access, service providers and related parties should be subject to the 
anticompetitive conduct provisions of the Gas Pipelines Access Law dealing with 
preventing or hindering access (s.13 of schedule 1 of the Gas Pipelines Access 
Law).  
Under the proposed monitoring regime, a service provider should comply with the 
minimum ring fencing requirements in s.4.1 of the Gas Code. However, s.4.1(e) 
should not apply for monitored pipelines, rather a new alternative provision 
should apply as follows:  
  allocate any costs that are shared between an activity that is covered by a set of 
accounts described in s.4.1(c) and any other activity according to a 
methodology for allocating costs that is transparent and disclosed as part of 
the monitoring regime information disclosure requirements. 
Under the proposed monitoring regime, information disclosure requirements 
should involve: 
•  focusing more on trend performance, including profitability 
•  reporting and monitoring after the event, without any need for prior 
endorsement by the regulator 
•  the regulator particularly recording cases where access negotiations have been 
unsuccessful.  
To improve regulatory certainty, and reduce the possibility of regulatory creep, 
information disclosure requirements of the proposed monitoring regime should 
be set out in disclosure guidelines developed prior to implementation of the 
monitoring regime. The National Competition Council, or another suitable 
organisation other than the regulator undertaking the monitoring function, 




RECOMMENDATION 8.7     




involve an open and transparent consultative process. It should be the 
responsibility of the entity developing the guidelines (the National Competition 
Council, for example) to update the guidelines when substantive need arises. 
The following information could guide the body responsible for developing the 
information disclosure requirements:  
•  Access provision information including number of negotiations commenced in 
the year, number of negotiations completed resulting in an access agreement 
being negotiated, number of access negotiations withdrawn from by the access 
seeker, number of access negotiations withdrawn from by the service provider, 
number of negotiations in dispute, number of dispute resolution processes 
commenced and still in progress, and number of dispute resolution processes 
completed (with an accompanying note about the outcomes of completed dispute 
resolution processes).  
•  High level financial information (for example, a statement of financial position, 
a statement of financial performance, and a statement of cash flow) that accords 
with the ring fencing requirements in s.4 of the Gas Code. There should be 
disclosure of notes to the financial statements and any other information 
necessary to give a true and fair view. 
•  Operational statistics including quantities and prices for aggregated inputs, 
quantities and prices for monitored services and the percentage change.  
•  Information on dealings with associates including details of the associates, 
aggregated total revenue from associates, aggregated total volume sold to 
associates and an aggregate index of the price deviation for transactions with 
associates (including disclosure of the index method). 
The Commission envisages monitoring information would be published annually for 
each pipeline. The information to be reported would not be overly onerous and 
preferably would comprise information that is already collected by service 
providers. The information disclosure guidelines would not specify disclosure of the 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC).  
The relevant regulator should collate and publish annually the information 
disclosed by a service provider under the proposed monitoring regime. Any 
commentary made by the regulator should be of a factual nature only, for 
example, the regulator should not make any determinations on the 
appropriateness of costs and prices. 
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To ensure the data disclosed by service providers under the proposed monitoring 
regime are accurate: 
•  chief executive officers (CEOs) should be required to sign a declaration 
stating that the data are true 
•  financial information and financial performance measures should be certified 
by an auditor 
•  financial penalties should be available through the courts if companies refuse 
to provide the required monitoring data within the established deadlines. 
Where the proposed monitoring option is applied, it should apply for a minimum 
period of five years, during which there would be no shift to access arrangement 
with reference tariffs regulation. Following this period, monitoring would 
continue to apply, subject to a decision by the Minister, following a 
recommendation by the National Competition Council, and an application from 
the monitoring regulator that access arrangement with reference tariffs 
regulation should apply. A decision to continue with monitoring would apply for 
a five-year period. Any person can apply for revocation of coverage of a 
monitored pipeline at any time. 
For pipelines that are covered and subject to the proposed monitoring regime, 
only the relevant regulator should be able to apply to the National Competition 
Council to shift the form of regulation to access arrangements with reference 
tariffs.  
The effectiveness of monitoring regulation depends in part on the threat of access 
arrangement with reference tariffs regulation possibly being applied in the future. 
The service provider’s commercial behaviour will be influenced by the threat of 
being subject to access arrangement with reference tariffs regulation at the end of 
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Pipelines currently covered with cost-based price regulation should remain 
covered, and continue to be subject to the access arrangement with reference 
tariffs regulation. Movement from this price regulation would require an 
application to the National Competition Council for revocation. Following a 
recommendation from the National Competition Council, the Minister would 
make a decision on coverage, and the form of regulation where coverage is 
retained.  
To give primacy to the Gas Access Regime and to reduce forum shopping, it is 
necessary to have the Gas Access Regime certified as effective under part IIIA of 
the national access regime. It is likely that the relevant Minister, following a 
recommendation from the National Competition Council, would be able to certify 
the new regime effective.  
To remove uncertainty, pending a decision by the Minister following a 
recommendation from the National Competition Council that the Gas Access 
Regime would be certified as effective, clause 6 of the Competition Principles 
Agreement should be modified as supported by the Australian Government in its 
response to the recommendation in the Commission’s review of the national 
access regime.  
Investment and access arrangements 
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission’s draft greenfields 
guideline does not substantially alter the potential for the Gas Access Regime to 
discourage investment. This is because the published guideline: 
•  is only a draft (and has been so for at least two years) 
•  maintains the wide discretion that the Gas Code gives to regulators to set key 
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Extended access arrangement periods might reduce the risk of unforeseen changes 
in regulatory parameters (parameter risk). However, the extent to which risk is 
reduced depends on the types of review mechanisms that regulators require in an 
access arrangement of extended duration. 
Fixed principle provisions that allow some regulatory parameters to be locked in 
for a certain period have the potential to reduce the risk of future changes in a 
regulator’s behaviour (parameter risk). However, the extent to which risk is 
reduced is limited. The extent of risk reduction depends on the fixed period allowed 
by regulators and on which parameters can be fixed. 
The Gas Access Regime should be amended so that the relevant Minister, after 
receiving a recommendation from the National Competition Council, can provide 
a binding no-coverage ruling for a proposed pipeline if it does not meet the 
coverage criteria. A binding no-coverage ruling should remain in effect for 
15 years from when the pipeline commences operations, unless the information 
relied on by the relevant Minister or National Competition Council was 
intentionally misleading. After 15 years of operation, a pipeline that was subject 
to a binding no-coverage ruling should continue to remain uncovered unless 
there is a successful coverage application. 
If recommendation 9.1 is implemented, then the national access regime (part IIIA 
of the Trade Practices Act 1974) should be amended so that a gas pipeline cannot 
be declared while it is subject to a binding no-coverage ruling under the Gas 
Access Regime. 
Approval of an access arrangement (including reference tariffs) before construction 
could reduce the risk of future changes in a regulator’s behaviour (parameter risk). 
However, pipeline investors would be unlikely to seek to be subject to a regulator 
approved access arrangement with reference tariffs, given the costs and time 
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Adding a fixed premium could address the asymmetric truncation of returns to some 
extent. A fixed premium would be a low-cost mechanism to promote investment, 
given its low administrative costs and the limited scope for strategic behaviour. 
However, it involves difficult implementation issues, such as the level of the 
premium and whether it should be restricted to riskier greenfield projects. 
A benefit/loss (symmetric) sharing mechanism is not a satisfactory means of 
mitigating the investment distorting effects of price regulation from truncating 
upside returns. Such a mechanism shifts both downside and upside risk from 
investors to users. Even if such a risk transfer was considered appropriate, 
benefit/loss sharing mechanisms would be subject to a wide range of practical 
problems.  
It is appropriate for service providers to have the right to seek revisions to their 
access arrangement at any time if demand is lower than forecast. This limits the 
damage caused by regulatory error. However, service provider initiated reviews 
are not an effective mechanism for addressing the investment distorting effects of 
asymmetric truncation. 
The Commission’s recommendation to introduce binding no-coverage rulings 
would give regulation free periods of at least 15 years to new pipelines that do not 
satisfy the coverage criteria. Extending the application of regulation free periods to 
new pipelines that satisfy the coverage criteria could reduce competition in 
upstream and downstream markets, and possibly distort investment. The case for 
providing regulation free periods to all new pipelines is weakened further by the 
Commission’s recommendation to have a monitoring option as an alternative to a 
regulated access arrangement with reference tariffs. 
Ring fencing and associate contracts 
The ring fencing and associate contract provisions of the Gas Code are warranted 
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The requirement under s.7.1 of the Gas Code that a service provider seek 
authorisation for the supply of a reference service at the reference tariff imposes 
costs on the service provider, with little apparent benefit. 
Section 7.1 of the Gas Code should be amended so that a service provider 
entering an associate contract for the supply of a reference service at the 
reference tariff is not required to seek authorisation. However, the service 
provider must provide the contract and any necessary information to the relevant 
regulator to satisfy the regulator that it is a contract for a reference service at the 
reference tariff. 
Approval of asset management contracts under the associate contract provisions is 
unnecessary.  
The associate contract provisions should be amended to clarify that these 
provisions do not apply to asset management contracts.  
To ensure regulators can adequately assess the costs of an associated business 
that undertakes activities under service agreements and contractual arrangements 
with a service provider in relation to a covered pipeline, the following subsections 
should be added to s.4.1 of the Gas Code: 
s.4.1B An Associate of a Service Provider of a Covered Pipeline that undertakes 
activities under service agreements and contractual arrangements with a 
Service Provider in relation to the Covered Pipeline must (if requested by 
the Relevant Regulator): 
(a) establish and maintain a separate set of accounts in respect of the 
Services provided to the Covered Pipeline 
(b) allocate any costs that are shared between an activity that is covered by 
a set of accounts described in s.4.1B(a) and any other activity 
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s.4.1C  A Service Provider when entering service agreements and contractual 
arrangements with an Associate for activities undertaken in relation to a 
covered pipeline, must ensure that the terms and conditions of the contract 
will allow s.4.1B to be implemented.  
To ensure regulators can adequately assess the costs of an associated business 
that undertakes activities under service agreements and contractual arrangements 
with a service provider in relation to the covered pipeline, the following 
subsection should be added to s.4.2 of the Gas Code: 
s.4.2A  In complying with ss4.1B(a) and (b) an Associate of a Service Provider 
must: 
(a) if the Relevant Regulator has published general accounting guidelines 
for Associates which apply to the accounts being prepared, comply with 
those guidelines; or 
(b) if the Relevant Regulator has not published such guidelines, comply 
with guidelines prepared by the Associate and approved by the Relevant 
Regulator or, if there are no such guidelines, comply with such 
guidelines (if any) as the Relevant Regulator advises the Associate 
apply to that Associate from time to time. 
Such guidelines may, amongst other things, require the accounts to contain 
sufficient information, and to be presented in such a manner, as would enable the 
assessment (and benchmarking) by the Relevant Regulator of the costs of the 
activities undertaken in relation to the Covered Pipeline by an Associate under 
service agreements and contractual arrangements with a Service Provider. 
To remove potentially conflicting objectives from the Gas Access Regime, s.4.1(e) 
of the Gas Code should be amended to delete reference to the term ‘otherwise fair 
and reasonable’. 
The Gas Access Regime already provides adequate safeguards to ensure that asset 
operators and managers that undertake activities in upstream and downstream 
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Administrative and appeal processes 
There are valid concerns about the inadequate timeliness of regulatory decisions in 
some cases under the Gas Access Regime. 
The Gas Access Regime should be amended, whereby the regulator would be able 
to extend the period for approval of an access arrangement by two months only 
once. If judicial proceedings commence, the regulator’s time should 
automatically be extended by the length of time taken to complete the judicial 
proceedings.  
The Gas Access Regime should be amended whereby the ‘further final decision’ 
should be removed from the approval process for access arrangements. 
The Gas Access Regime should be amended so regulators can specify a date by 
which the service provider must submit proposed amendments to an access 
arrangement. 
Limitations on the grounds of appeal under s.39 of the Gas Pipelines Access Law 
should be removed to allow a full merits review on access arrangements drafted 
and approved by the regulator. This would be consistent with the grounds of 
merits review for coverage decisions.  
The material that can be introduced to the appeal body for a merits review of a 
coverage decision under s.38 of the Gas Pipelines Access Law should be restricted 
to material that has already gone before the primary decision maker. This would 
be consistent with the merits review process for access arrangements drafted and 
approved by the regulator.  
The application of the Australian Government’s cost recovery policy to the funding 
of a national regulator through an industry levy would bring rigour to the funding 
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The Council of Australian Governments and the Ministerial Council on Energy are 
progressing the reform program for the energy sector. The governance 
arrangements involving the division of responsibilities and functions among the 
MCE, the Australian Energy Market Commission, and the Australian Energy 
Regulator apply the principle of the separation of policy development from the 
administration of policy. 
While there are some issues common to the electricity and gas supply sectors, there 
are significant differences, including in relation to market structure, size and 
maturity, market rules, nature of energy generation and transportation technology. 
These differences have implications for investment, risks and appropriate 
regulation. 
Similar considerations are relevant for making decisions about coverage and the 
form of regulation. (These considerations also apply to both transmission and 
distribution infrastructure for natural gas.) The same agency should make 
recommendations on these issues. 
There are sound reasons for the agency responsible for developing the information 
disclosure guidelines, and updating them when the need arises, being separate from 
the agency administering the monitoring function. 
The agency that recommends coverage of a pipeline, should also be responsible 
for recommending the form of regulation to apply to the pipeline. 
The agency responsible for making recommendations on pipeline coverage and 
form of regulation decisions (currently the National Competition Council) should 
be separate from the regulator actually responsible for administering the 
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The National Gas Pipelines Advisory Committee is not working effectively, and 
significant reform is necessary. The Ministerial Council on Energy’s proposal for 
the Australian Energy Market Commission to be responsible for managing the code 
change processes would seem to address the concerns about NGPAC.  
Ultimate responsibility for decisions on pipeline coverage, the form of regulation 
and major changes to the Gas Code should continue to reside at the ministerial 
level. The Ministerial Council on Energy’s proposed framework for code change 
accommodates this approach. It appears that the MCE would delegate most 
determinations on code changes to the Australian Energy Market Commission 
(which is accountable to the MCE). However, some changes, including changes to 
MCE policy protected provisions of the Gas Code, require decision by the MCE. 
The reforms of the Gas Access Regime recommended by the Commission in this 
report would fit within the institutional arrangements developed by the Ministerial 
Council on Energy for a national approach to energy access regulation involving 
the Australian Energy Market Commission and the Australian Energy Regulator. 
FINDING 12.5 
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